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COURT REPORTS

reservation;" and (4) the Tribe reasonably expects to be capable of
carrying out the functions of an effective water quality program in a
manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the Clean Water Act
and regulations. The dispute in this case pertained to the intent of the
third requirement.
In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a Tribe
has "inherent power" to regulate the activities of non-members if the
regulated activities affect the "political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the Tribe." These potential impacts must
be serious and substantial. Generally, however, a Tribe lacks authority
over non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation. Montana
argued that the scope of inherent tribal authority was a question of law
for which EPA receives no deference. It further alleged that the EPA
committed a mistake of law in the delineation of the scope of inherent
tribal authority based on the Supreme Court's decision in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.

Although the court agreed that the EPA receives no deference in
delineation of the scope of tribal inherent authority, it did not agree
that the EPA committed any material mistakes of law in this
delineation. The EPA acted carefully in establishing its regulations. In
applying the standards of both Montana and Brendale to this case, the
EPA found that the non-member activities posed a serious and
substantial threat to Tribal health and welfare and that Tribal
regulation was essential. The court agreed and recognized that threats
to water may invoke inherent tribal authority over non-Indians.
Additionally, the court rejected the motion to intervene. It held
that since the Intervenors held a NPDES permit, the transfer of the
right to establish WQS from the state to the Tribes will have no
immediate or any foreseeable, demonstrable effect. Thus, the court of
appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Tribes.

Kimberley Crawford

Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, No. 93-654L, 1998 WL
784551 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 19, 1998) (holding no Fifth Amendment taking
of submerged land when: 1) the submerged land is subject to a United
States navigational servitude; 2) the majority of original parcel, of
which the submerged land was a part, sold for a substantial gain; and
3) the remaining non-submerged land was not restricted from all use).
In 1956, the predecessors to Palm Beach Isles Associates ("PBIA")
purchased a 311.7 acre parcel in Riviera Beach, Florida, for $380,190
that included submerged lands in Lake Worth. In 1967, PBIA applied
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for and the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") granted
a permit to dredge and fill the property located within Lake Worth.
However, PBIA did not undertake work pursuant to the permit. In
1968, PBIA sold 261 acres of the 311.7 acre parcel for approximately
$1,000,000 and retained 50.7 acres, of which 49.3 acres were
submerged lands below the mean high water mark, and 1.4 acres were
adjoining shoreline.
In 1988, PBIA filed an application with the Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation ("DER") to dredge and fill the 50.7 acres of
lake-bottom and adjoining shoreline in order to develop single family
homes.
In denying PBIA's application, DER found the proposed
development would eliminate wetlands, disrupt marine life, adversely
affect water quality and navigation of the waterway, and set a
precedent for similar development. Lake Worth is part of the Atlantic
Intracoastal Waterway, which is a federal navigational channel that
subjects submerged lands below the mean high water mark to a
The proposed
navigational servitude of the United States.
development was also contrary to public interest pursuant to Section
403.918(2) of the Florida Statutes. However, the DER, in the denial
notice, stated that a design incorporating features resulting in minimal
environmental impact such as docks and boardwalks could be
pursued.
In 1989, PBIA filed a permit application with the Corps pursuant
to section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401467 (1988) and section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1988), twenty-two years after PBIA's first permit application had
been approved. The Corps denied this application, stating that
issuance would be contrary to 404(b) (1) guidelines and public
interest, but stipulated that all viable development options of the 50.7
acre parcel had not been explored.
PBIA filed this suit for damages alleging that the Corps' denial of
PBIA's application for a permit to dredge and fill the 50.7 acre parcel
constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Both sides filed cross-motions
for summary judgment.
The court held that the United States was not obligated to
compensate PBIA for the alleged taking of the submerged 49.3 acres
because it was subject to a navigational servitude. The navigable waters
of the United States are public property and under the exclusive
control of the federal government under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. In addition, the court held PBIA's claim of
a per se taking of the remaining 1.4 acres of adjoining shoreline invalid
because the entire parcel of either 311.7 acres or 50.7 acres must be
considered for the purposes of assessing the critical property at issue.
Here, PBIA made a substantial financial gain when it sold the 261
acres in 1968 and had not been denied all beneficial use of the
remaining 1.4 acres by application denial of either the DER or the
Corps. PBIA still had the right to apply for a permit from the Corps
and a zoning variance from the state and local authorities that would
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allow water dependent uses of the parcel. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the United States.
ElaineSoltis

United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the
defendant criminally liable for violating and conspiring to violate the
Clean Water Act and other state and local laws by dumping industrial
waste from his business into storm and sewer drains).
In September 1997, a grand jury indicted the defendant, Thomas
Iverson for violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Washington
Administrative Code ('"AC"), and the City of Olympia's Municipal
Code. The prosecution charged Iverson with both violating and
conspiring to violate these laws between 1992 and 1995.
The
indictments arose out of illegal disposal of industrial waste from
Iverson's business, CH20,Inc. ("CH20").
Iverson was the company's founder and served as the president and
chairman of the board. The company blended chemicals to create
numerous products, including acid cleaners and heavy-duty alkaline
compounds. The company shipped the blended chemicals to its
customers in drums, and asked the customers to return the drums
when finished. When the drums were returned, they were often not
cleaned properly and contained a chemical residue which had to be
removed before the drum was used again.
To remove the residue, CH20 instituted a drum-cleaning
operation, which generated wastewater. On several occasions, the
defendant asked the local sewer authority if it would accept the
wastewater. However, because the metal content of the wastewater was
so high, the sewer authority refused to accept it.
Subsequently, the defendant discharged the wastewater, and
ordered his employees to discharge the wastewater, either on the
industrial plant's property, through a sewer drain at an apartment
complex the defendant owned, or through a sewer drain at the
defendant's home. He continued these discharges for about eight
years until he hired someone to dispose of the wastewater properly.
CH20 either paid a waste disposal company to dispose of the
wastewater, or shipped the drums to a professional outside contractor
for cleaning. However, these procedures cost the company thousands
of dollars each month and Iverson discontinued this program four
years later.
Shortly thereafter, Iverson bought a warehouse in Olympia and
restarted its drum-cleaning operation at the warehouse and disposed
of its wastewater through the municipal sewer. Iverson did not obtain
a permit to make these discharges. Iverson continued this method of
wastewater disposal for three years, until CH20 learned it was under

